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INTRODUCTION
This article examines American conceptions of sovereignty-as they appear in the writings of US scholars of international law, and those US international relations scholars who deal with international law. At first glance, the US literature is dominated by two distinct conceptions of sovereignty: (1) A statist conception that privileges the territorial integrity and political independence of governments regardless of their democratic or undemocratic character; (2) A popular conception that privileges the rights of peoples rather than governments, especially when widespread human rights violations are committed by a totalitarian regime. However, on closer examination, the two conceptions are in fact different manifestations of a single, uniquely American conception of sovereignty-one which elevates the United States above other countries and seeks to protect it against outside influences while, concurrently, maximizing its ability to intervene overseas.
The single conception of sovereignty is able to encompass both statist and popular sub-conceptions because the latter have different-though not mutually exclusiveagendas. The statist conception is concerned with protecting the United States against outside influences and has little to say about the sovereignty of other countries. The popular conception is concerned with limiting the sovereignty of other countries and has little to say about the sovereignty of the United States. This article exposes the single US conception of sovereignty-as it exists in the academic literature of international law and international relations-and arrives at some tentative conclusions derived from the unique position and history of the world's most powerful state. 
TWO CONCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Stephen
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-2 -that challenge has come from two different directions: globalisation and the rise of human rights. Yet neither of these challenges alters the basic nature of rules, compliance and behaviour in the international system: to Krasner, this will always be characterised by "organised hypocrisy". 3 Self-interest is still the defining cause of action, and sovereignty-despite seeming under threat-is not about to disappear, given the powerful state interest in its continued existence.
Henkin's work is representative of the popular conception of sovereignty. Henkin argues that sovereignty is the primary obstacle to international law as it should be. It is a misleading and misguided term, an anachronistic hangover from the days of princedoms that is "largely unnecessary and better avoided". 4 Whereas Krasner implicitly attributes normative value to state survival, Henkin argues: "The state system is a human creation and a human development; it ought to be continually examined, occasionally calibrated, and sometimes changed, the better to serve human purposes". 5 Indeed, Henkin believes that the international system has already moved toward human values as its organising principle, 6 that "human rights law has shaken the sources of international law, reshaped its character and enlarged its domain" 7 , and thus radically derogated from and infringed upon sovereignty.
These two conceptions of sovereignty-statist and popular-permeate most of the US literature on international relations and international law. And, as is demonstrated by some prominent theoretical writings, what appear to be different conceptions of sovereignty more often than not collapse into a single conception-a conception which generally favours the United States.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
One of the more fertile areas of international theory in the United States concerns the relationship between international law and international relations. Consequently, the interdisciplinary literature of "IL/IR" offers valuable insights into US conceptions of sovereignty.
John Mearsheimer offers an unashamedly realist approach to international institutions (including international law) that comports clearly to the statist conception of sovereignty. He argues that the key disagreement between realists and so-called "institu- Krasner, Stephen D., Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 4 Henkin, Louis, International Law: Politics and Values (Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1995), p. 9. 5 Henkin, International Law, p. 25. 6 Henkin, Louis, 'Human Rights and State "Sovereignty"' Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1995-6) vol. 25, pp. 31-45, p. 32. 7 Henkin, 'Human Rights and State "Sovereignty"', p. 36.
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-3 -tionalists" concerns whether institutions markedly affect the prospects for international stability. 8 To realists, institutions reflect the distribution of power in the world; based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, they have no independent effect on state behaviour. 9 States will participate in an institution only while it remains in their interest to do so. Mearsheimer rejects the institutionalists' claim that institutions can produce cooperation, stability and, potentially, peace. Institutionalism has focused on absolute gains, and on areas where state interests align and cooperation is easy to secure. This has produced excessive optimism over the capacities and potential of institutions. 10 Indeed: "What is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behaviour". 11 To Mearsheimer the overriding logic of the system is self-help: states will do as much as they are able to get away with. International law has made few if any inroads on sovereignty.
Liberals have a different picture of the international system and the role of international law and other institutions. Robert Keohane argues that, in order to be able to understand international cooperation and discord, "it is necessary to develop a knowledge of how international institutions work, and how they change". 12 Without institutions there can be little international cooperation and, without international cooperation, "the prospects for our species would be very poor indeed".
13
Keohane divides approaches to international institutions into instrumentalist and normative "optics". Seen through the instrumentalist optic, "states use the rules of international law as instruments to attain their interests". 14 Seen through the normative optic, "shared norms, and the processes by which those norms are interpreted", have an impact on state policies. 15 The normative optic does not ignore power or interests but argues that such explanations are insufficient. According to Keohane, international relations scholars tend to be instrumentalists and international law scholars tend to be normative, and a synthesis of the optics can help explain international institutions. 
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-7 -do so. Second, Wendt's theory pays little attention to power structures and the role power plays in the social interactions which, for Wendt, create identities and interests.
Third, if interaction is prior to identities and interests, is there really a point of "first" interaction in which identity and interaction are unformed?
Wendt's work on sovereignty treats institutions and ideational structures as malleable. From his perspective, our conception of sovereignty can be rewritten simply by thinking about it differently. But while some evolution of the institution of sovereignty has undoubtedly occurred, the fluidity and "lightness" of Wendt's theorisation of social institutions would seem to take it too far. It ignores the impact of material differences 
MILITARY INTERVENTION
Military intervention is one of the key ways in which sovereignty is infringed and the US literature concerning it is particularly interesting for us-because conceptions of popular sovereignty are frequently deployed in justification.
In 1992, Thomas Franck seized upon the idea that governments derive their power and legitimacy from the consent of the governed, and used it to justify military interven- Anthony D'Amato also linked human rights and intervention, arguing that rules prohibiting intervention "do not constitute the real rules of international law but, rather, are quasi-rules, invented by ruling elites to insulate their domestic control against external challenge". 37 Consequently, sovereignty is no bar to the protection of human rights.
38
Although D'Amato's preference is for multilateral intervention, ideally by the United Nations, his "bottom line is that… any nation with the will and the resources may intervene to protect the population of another nation against… tyranny". 39 Again, D'Amato's argument is inapplicable to the United States, except in so far as it facilitates US interventions elsewhere.
Michael Reisman argued that the term sovereignty "has had a long and varied history during which it has been given different meanings, hues and tones, depending on the context and the objectives of those using the word". 40 It evolved away from meaning the power and control of a prince over his kingdom, to meaning popular sovereignty, vested in the people and based on human rights. Reisman contended that a coup, putsch, or even just corruption of the electoral process constitutes a violation of popular sover- 
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-9 -twentieth century can hardly say that an invasion by outside forces to remove the caudillo and install the elected government is a violation of national sovereignty".
41
In international law, the right of self-defence can be used to limit sovereignty at the same time that it is deployed to protect it. It has long been accepted that any state which attacks another state waives its right to the protections of sovereignty, within the limits of necessity and proportionality. But what about an attack that has yet to happen, and may never happen? John Yoo argues that the customary international law right to use force in anticipation of an attack is a "well-established aspect of the 'inherent right' of self-defence" 42 -11 -term, it would hardly be sage policy advice to suggest the creation of good neighbourhoods in order to make urgently needed humanitarian intervention successful".
48
The solution, therefore, is to redefine the boundaries of a neighbourhood. If the Balkans were a bad neighbourhood, the 1999 Kosovo intervention succeeded because Europe redefined its boundaries to include them. For this reason, any decision to intervene must consider not only the society, but the neighbourhood where it is located, and the possibilities for expanding good neighbourhoods close by. 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
Traditional conceptions of sovereignty limit this attribute to states, but non- 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND US DOMESTIC LAW
The peculiarity of US conceptions of sovereignty is brought into sharp relief in academic discussions of the relationship between international law and US domestic law-a relationship that has generated a substantial literature within the United States, not least because of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789.
Alien Tort Claims Act
International law considers some crimes so heinous that perpetrators can be brought to justice wherever they are found. This principle of universal jurisdiction entitles states to either prosecute those accused or extradite them to another state that will. The Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), a US piece of legislation, extended the principle of universal jurisdiction to civil litigation, granting jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States". 64 The ATCA was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, but was largely ignored until 1980 and the Filartiga case, when it was interpreted as providing a cause of action in federal courts in cases involving torture committed by officials of foreign governments. In Filartiga, the Federal Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, had to resolve several issues, not least the fact that the ATCA was almost 200 years old. It ruled:
"courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today". 65 Promoters of the ATCA clearly support a popular conception of sovereignty. Consider, for instance, the impact on Paraguayan sovereignty of the Filartiga case, where the defendant had been a police chief at the time of the torture. Yet the ATCA does not apply to the US government or its officials as defendants (because of "sovereignty immunity" and the "political questions doctrine"), nor to acts committed within the United
States. So supporters of the ATCA are in no way challenging the sovereignty of the United States. For this reason, one might ask why the Bush administration and some academics regard the Filartiga line of cases as a threat. As the following section suggests, it is not just sovereignty they perceive to be threatened, but the balance of power between the federal government and the constituent states of the United States.
International Law as US Law
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith argue against what they refer to as the "modern position", which Bradley defines as "the proposition that customary international law has the status of federal common law" 73 -and therefore pre-empts inconsistent state law.
Bradley claims that one of the modern position's central arguments, that customary international law had the status of federal law in the 19 th century, is false. Instead, the relevant precedent is Erie Railroad v Tompkins (1938), which the modern position contradicts. According to Bradley, Erie was significant because it rejected two principles which had previously underpinned the jurisprudence: that federal courts can apply law not derived from a sovereign source, and that courts merely discover the common law rather than make it. Thus, to Bradley, Erie ended the debate as to whether customary international law is federal law, and whether federal courts can apply customary international law which has not been incorporated by the political branches.
Bradley and Goldsmith are particularly concerned about what they identify as "new" customary international law, which arose mainly in the twentieth century, predominantly concerns human rights, and is "less consensual and less objective than traditional customary international law, and … more likely to conflict with domestic law". 74 More to the point, they fear that this new law will "regulate many areas that were formerly of exclusive domestic concern". Koh disagrees that allowing treaties to have direct effect in US law is an affront to US sovereignty:
one uses "sovereignty" in the modern sense of that term-a nation's capacity to participate in international affairs-I would argue that the selective internalisation of international law into US law need not affront US sovereignty. To the contrary … the process of visibly obeying international norms builds US "soft power," enhances its moral authority, and strengthens US capacity for
global leadership in a post-September 11 world. 78 Koh argues that the desire to remain unfettered by international law is "ultimately… more America's loss than that of the world" 79 because it means that the United States rarely gets credit for the good it does, including by providing leadership on democracy and human rights. Moreover, "by opposing the global rules, the United States can end up undermining the legitimacy of the rules themselves… [and] disempower itself from invoking those rules, at precisely the moment when it needs those rules to serve its own national purposes". 80 Although he has a positive view of international law, note that Koh focuses on the law's ability to re-enforce US power and thus, presumably, its sover- 
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-18 -eignty-or at least its ability to not worry about the negative consequences of diminished or shared sovereignty.
Koh believes the correct reading of Erie and Sabbatino is that federal courts retain legitimate authority to treat established rules of customary international law as federal common law: "Far from being novel, the 'modern position' is actually a long-accepted, traditional reading of the federal courts' function. Both before and after Erie, the federal courts issued rulings construing the law of nations. Erie never intended to alter or disrupt that practice". 81 "At bottom," Koh argues, "Bradley and Goldsmith's complaint reduces to this: 'unelected federal judges apply customary international law made by the world community at the expense of state prerogatives'." 82 And to this he responds: "So what else is new?" 83 Moreover, "Bradley and Goldsmith nowhere explain why explicit federal legislation-a process notoriously dominated by committees, strong-willed individuals, collective action problems, and private rent-seeking-is invariably more democratic than the judge-driven process they criticize". 84 On the issue of a "new" and subversive customary international law, Koh replies that there is "no clear line [which] separates the 'old' from the 'new' customary international law because both have influenced American law through precisely the same transnational legal process". 85 Moreover, since the United States has long been the most influential country in the making of customary international law, including in the human rights field, it is hardly being forced into positions it opposes.
But Koh, Bradley and Goldsmith, despite their differences, share a statist conception of US sovereignty. They simply differ in their assessments of where US interests lie. As
Koh observes, Bradley and Goldsmith have simply stumbled into the "power struggle image" of state-federal conflict, which portrays states and national governments as competing sovereigns. 
Rational Choice
Rational choice theory has gained a following across numerous academic disciplines, especially in the United States, including among the anti-internationalists. Following basic rational choice precepts, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that "international law emerges from states acting rationally to maximise their interests, given their perceptions of the interests of other states and the distribution of state power". 88 At the same time, they exclude a preference for obeying international law from their composite of state preferences from which they infer interests. This they do for two reasons. First, it is "unenlightening" 89 to explain compliance in terms of a preference for obeying international law. Second, a preference for compliance is dependent upon what citizens and leaders are "willing to pay in terms of other things that they care about", such as security or economic growth. Goldsmith and Posner assert that people "care about these latter goods more intensely than they do about international law compliance". 90 Thus any theory of international law must show why states comply, rather than just assuming that they have a preference for so doing.
In common with other anti-internationalists, Goldsmith and Posner argue that an overly optimistic idea of the power and potential of international law can be a dangerous thing, encouraging states to sacrifice elements of their sovereignty, adopt multilateralism and compromise their ability to act independently. In echoing realist international relations theory, Goldsmith and Posner place survival at the apex of state preferences, closely followed by the strengthening of US business and the protection of US jobs.
They manifest no concern for the welfare of people overseas. is the elucidation of those interests, and here rational choice can assist. Their conception of sovereignty is, again, entirely statist.
Andrew Guzman also uses a rational choice approach, though for him the selfinterest of states is manifested primarily as reputation. A good record of obeying international law and abiding by international agreements has, as its pay-off, an increased willingness on the part of other states to cooperate. As a result, "We can no longer be satisfied with the simple conclusion that the ordering principle of the international legal order is pacta sunt servanda, the principle that 'treaties are to be obeyed'."
92 And yet, Guzman's approach, while more nuanced and less anti-internationalist that Goldsmith and Posner's, shares its adherence to a statist conception of sovereignty.
Is International Law really Law?
A final strand of the anti-internationalist literature denies that international law is really law. This school of thought focuses primarily on the law regulating the use of force, and is motivated by a desire that nothing whatsoever should stand in the way of US sovereignty, including its sovereign right to assert itself abroad.
Michael Glennon argues that, since the 1999 Kosovo intervention, the rules concerning the use of force are "no longer regarded as obligatory by states" and "the [UN]
Charter's use-of-force regime has all but collapsed". 93 The international system has become split into a de jure system where "illusory rules" govern the use of force and a de facto system where states follow self-interest and the legal rules are all but ignored.
Maintaining the fiction that states are constrained by international rules is, according to Glennon, more dangerous than having no rules at all because it engenders a false sense of security. We thus see several elements in the anti-internationalist conception of sovereignty.
First, there is an overriding concern that international law not impede US actions. Any attempts to impose international rules upon the United States are mistaken and illconceived. Second, rational choice theory is used to prove the conditionality of states' compliance which international law: such compliance is neither automatic nor guaranteed. States will defect if it is in their interest to do so. Both these elements lead to the questioning of whether international law is really law. According to this school of thought, international law is little more than wishful thinking and incapable of meeting the demands of international politics. All the anti-internationalists share the same underlying cynicism about the ability of law to constrain power. In the end, their conception of US sovereignty involves little more than that-unadulterated, overwhelming power.
SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
John Jackson explains that debates about sovereignty are really debates about allocations of power and that a discourse of sovereignty is adopted to conceal what is really a discourse about power. Thus "most of the sovereignty objections of joining an international treaty are arguments about the allocation of power among different levels of different human institutions, mostly governmental." 102 The sovereignty discourse is used because it has an emotional appeal and is often used in a "blunt and undifferentiated way as a surrogate argument by opponents of some government proposal."
103
The link between sovereignty and discourses of power might usefully be illuminated by a consideration of the early days of the American Republic, when considerable value was ascribed to international law. This was mainly because of the United States' relative weakness compared to other nations-America was glad of the protections afforded by international rules. The United States also promoted several developments in international law-such as the right to self-defence as an exception to the unlimited legality of Yet there are distinctive elements of the American psyche, identified early on by Alexis de Tocqueville, which would seem to influence how Americans conceptualize sovereignty today. Most important of these is the celebration of popular sovereignty within the United States. As Tocqueville saw it, Americans essentially did rule themselves, so weak and restricted was government, and so aware of its popular origins:
"The people reign over the American political world as God rules over the universe. It is the cause and the end of all things; everything rises out of it and is absorbed back into it". 104 As a consequence, the US Constitution is considered-not just by John Boltonto be superior to international law.
A corollary element is the high level of political activism amongst ordinary Americans, which Tocqueville called "a restless activity, superabundant force, an energy never found elsewhere". 105 In Tocqueville's account, if an obstacle blocks a road, the local people will form a committee and solve the problem themselves, without ever thinking of contacting local government. 106 A historic suspicion of government, particularly the federal government, helps explain the anti-internationalists' opposition to international law as federal law, and to supranational institutions especially. 
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-25 -political discourse increased in strength and stridency during this period-partly as a result of the language and actions of President George W. Bush himself.
Although a belief in self-government, popular sovereignty and its own moral superiority might push the United States to expand, a suspicion of big government and a preference for the parochial would seem to push it toward isolation. These two countervailing tendencies have shaped US foreign policy for centuries. They necessarily shape contemporary US conceptions of sovereignty.
We suspect that the dichotomous nature of US conceptions of sovereignty can be explained-at least partly-by these elements of the American psyche. On the one hand, self-belief, a "can-do" attitude and a conviction that others deserve popular sovereignty also, combine to generate a belief that the United States can and should intervene, and that interventions are invariably beneficial to recipient countries. In America's perception of itself, the US national interest hardly ever appears. On the other hand, the isolationist tendency and the belief in self-government combine to generate a belief that American sovereignty may never be compromised. Thus, ideology, activism and arrogance permit and justify intervention in other states while the absolute privileging of US self-government-as opposed to the relative privileging of self-government else- to be an entirely self-serving approach to sovereignty-until we understand that the two conceptions are but different sides of a single coin.
